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PRISON CONDITIONS UNDER IRISH LAW
AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
This publication seeks to raise awareness of prison law and
prisoners’ rights jurisprudence amongst legal professionals,
and to increase their research capacity in these areas. It
is part of a series of three papers, one of which examines
accountability structures and the law regulating Irish
prisons; the other explores practical matters surrounding
the taking of prison law cases.
The topic of this paper is ‘prison conditions under Irish law
and the European Convention on Human Rights’.
This publication is funded by the Irish Research Council
for the Humanities and Social Sciences, as part of its
Research Development Initiative. It is produced as part of a
collaborative project between the Irish Penal Reform Trust
and Dr. Mary Rogan BL of Dublin Institute of Technology,
called ‘Talking about Punishment: increasing understanding
of prisoners’ rights and how those rights may be vindicated”.
This paper seeks to state the law as of June 2012.
No liability is accepted for any errors or omissions or for
how this document is used. It is intended as a form of
research assistance for legal practitioners and not to act
as a substitute for legal advice. All errors and omissions
are the responsibility of Dr. Mary Rogan. Those using this
document are encouraged to submit any corrections and/or
supplementary information to Dr. Mary Rogan at
mary.rogan@dit.ie.
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STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
This paper provides an examination of domestic and Convention law relating to certain
aspects of prison conditions. The rights of prisoners as discussed by the Irish courts
are examined first. The test for when these rights are breached is then discussed. Irish
caselaw on prison conditions is analysed, followed by an examination of the application of
Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The focus of this document
is on the decisions of the courts under Irish and European Convention on Human Rights
law on overcrowding, slopping out, hygiene, and health.
The full text of relevant domestic and international legal instruments on prisons and
prisoners’ rights, along with reports of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, the Inspector of Prisons, and other bodies, can be found at
www.iprt.ie/prison–law.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS AND THE EFFECT OF IMPRISONMENT
Several decisions of the Irish courts have held that, while imprisonment inevitably involves
the deprivation of rights, those rights which are not necessarily diminished must continue
to be upheld. For example, in Mulligan v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison (hereinafter
Mulligan) the High Court held:

[A]ny attenuation of rights must be proportionate; the diminution must not
fall below the standards of reasonable human dignity and what is expected in
a mature society. Insofar as practicable, a prison authority must vindicate the
individual rights and dignity of each prisoner.1
In Murray v. Ireland2 it was held that the rights which may be exercised by a prisoner are
those which do not depend on the continuation of liberty and which are compatible with
the reasonable requirements of the Prison Service or which do not impose unreasonable
demands on it.
In Holland v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison3 it was held that a prisoner is obliged to suffer
such restrictions on constitutional rights as necessary to accommodate the serving of a
sentence. Subject to this proviso however, McKechnie J held that all other rights should
be capable of being exercised. McKechnie J also considered prisoners to have the right
to free communication, the right to practice one’s religion, and the right to natural and
constitutional justice, holding that this was not an exhaustive list.4 The court reiterated
that any restrictions on the constitutional rights of prisoners must be proportionate.

1
2
3
4
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[2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 14.
[1991] ILRM 465.
[2004] 2 IR 573.
[2004] 2 IR 573, at p. 594.
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In Devoy v. The Governor of Portlaoise Prison5 Edwards J recognised the broad discretion
vested in each Governor, but held that:

the application of the Rules must be in a manner which is respectful of and
intended to vindicate the constitutional rights of the prisoner to the extent that
they are not abrogated or suspended by the very fact of his being sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. Among the residual constitutional rights of a prisoner
which are not abrogated or suspended is the right to be treated humanely and
with human dignity”. Edwards J also held that “a prisoner such as the applicant
may be entitled to a degree of freedom of association as an aspect of his
constitutional right to humane treatment and human dignity.6
The rights of prisoners specifically recognised by the courts to date are summarised in
the case of Mulligan. MacMenamin J held that prisoners have the right to bodily integrity,
which necessitates that the Executive should protect the right to health of persons held
in custody as well as is reasonably possible in the circumstances.7 The court held: “as
a citizen, a prisoner is entitled to protection of his right to bodily integrity … He or she is
entitled not to have their health placed at risk. As a matter of general principle he or she
must be protected against inhuman or degrading treatment”.8 The court held further that
prisoners have a right not to be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment, a right to
protect life from serious endangerment, and a right to privacy. The court went on to affirm
that the conditions of detention must not be such as to seriously endanger a prisoner’s life
or health.9
In Kinsella v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison (hereinafter, Kinsella) the High Court had no
difficulty in accepting that a prisoner has a right to bodily integrity and that this right
encompasses a person’s psychological wellbeing.10
THE ISSUE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND LIMITATIONS ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
The limitations on rights occasioned by the fact of imprisonment are amplified by the
reluctance of the Irish courts to intervene in the running of prisons. The caselaw makes it
clear that the duty of the state to avoid exposing the health of a prisoner to risk or danger
is not absolute. The judgment in Mulligan held that it is not for the courts to recommend
to the Executive what is desirable or to fix priorities in health and welfare policy. This has
been held to mean that the rights to bodily integrity and the protection of health must be
subject to limitations arising out of what is practicable in the prison setting.11
Older caselaw has also emphasised the limitations on the rights of prisoners. In The State
(McDonagh) v. Frawley12 it was held that many “normal constitutional rights are abrogated
or suspended during the period of imprisonment”13 such that the prisoner must accept
prison discipline and accommodate himself or herself to the reasonable organisation of
prison life as laid down in the prison regulations.

5
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[2009] IEHC 288.
[2009] IEHC 288, at paragraph 88.
[2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 108(a).
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[2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 10(d).
[2011] IEHC 235.
Mulligan, at paragraph 90.
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The court went on to hold that a prisoner cannot demand the medical treatment he thinks
he should get, but will be given such medical treatment as the medical officer of the
prison thinks appropriate.
The High Court showed very wide latitude to a prison Governor in Foy v. Governor of
Cloverhill Prison when it held: “such measures incidental to imprisonment as are
necessary for the proper implementation of an order made by a court, whether for remand
of an accused or sentence of a convict, are within the entitlement of the governor in the
management of a prison”.14
The same judge, Charleton J, held in Walsh and others v. Governor of Midlands Prison15 the
continual review by the courts of the ordinary day–to–day decisions of prison authorities
carries a significant danger. Charleton J cited one US case, Turner v Safley,16 where
O’Connor J held:

Subjecting the day–to–day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration. The rule would also distort the decision making process, for
every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some
court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving
the problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of
what constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby
“unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of
prison administration.”17

In relation to Charleton J’s citation of US caselaw, it should be noted that a majority of the
US Supreme Court in Plata v. Brown18 did not cite the restrictive caselaw of the 1980s such
as Turner v. Safley. The cases Kennedy J, for the majority, cited to ground his judgment
regarding the rights of prisoners come from the 1970s,19 and the language he drew upon
is that of judicial responsibility to remedy the failures of the State, holding that the Courts
must not shirk from their obligations to protect the rights of all, including prisoners.20

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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[2010] IEHC 529, at paragraph 18.
[2012] IEHC 229.
(1987) 482 US 78.
Internal citations omitted.
563 U. S. _ (2011). See further Rogan, “Plata v. Brown” (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 261–275.
Hutto v. Finney 437 US 678, 678 (1979); Bell v. Woolfish 441 US 520 (1979).
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The question of how far the courts will intervene in prison administration is also at issue
when it comes to the remedies a court my direct. Mandamus is a difficult remedy to
obtain in a prison context, but may be given in an appropriate case. MacMenamin J in
Mulligan interpreted the decision of The State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison21
(hereinafter Richardson) as recognising that in an appropriate case a court:

has jurisdiction to actually direct improvements in prison conditions where
warranted to vindicate a constitutional right, and where the vindication of
such right is not constrained by boundaries such as practicability. Thus, for
example, were it to be established that there was an ongoing and serious threat
to a prisoner applicant’s health, the vindication of that constitutional right
could warrant a court in intervening by way of mandamus. The protection
and vindication of that right might then have to be balanced against other
constitutional provisions.22

This issue is discussed further below in the context of the decision to release a person
under Article 40.4 of the Constitution on the basis that the nature of the conditions
renders a person’s detention unlawful.
‘EVIL INTENT’ ON THE PART OF PRISON AUTHORITIES:
THE TEST FOR A BREACH OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The reluctance of the courts to intervene in prison life is most apparent in the test laid
down in the caselaw for when the rights of prisoners have been breached. The balance
of the older jurisprudence, and arguably also the judgment in Mulligan, indicates that in
order for a prisoner to be successful in arguing a breach of the right not to be exposed to
inhuman or degrading treatment, it would be necessary to establish an ‘evil purpose’ on
the part of the prison authorities in the maintenance of such conditions. In State (C) v.
Frawley23 (hereinafter, C) Finlay P considered the question of whether prison conditions
constituted a failure to protect a prisoner from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
such that the detention was unlawful. Finlay P held there had been no such failure,
stating that the purpose and intention of the restrictions and privations surrounding the
detention were neither punitive nor malicious.24 Finlay P went on to say:

I must construe the entire concept of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment
and punishment as being not only evil in its consequences but evil in its purpose
as well. It is most commonly inspired by revenge, retaliation, the creation of fear
or improper interrogation.25
MacMenamin J, analysing the case in the course of the Mulligan decision, held that C
does not derogate from the constitutional rights to which a prisoner is entitled but “rather
demonstrated the limitation of such rights by considerations of practicality, the common
good or protection of the prisoner himself. The rights in question are not absolute rights”.26

21
22
23
24
25
26
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There is some inconsistency in the caselaw here, however. C seems to suggest that it is
only where a prisoner is asserting a breach of the right not to be exposed to inhuman or
degrading treatment that it is necessary for the prisoner to show that there is ‘evil’ intent
on the part of the prison authorities. MacMenamin J followed this in Mulligan but did not
expressly apply this test to the other rights he was concerned with, such as privacy.
However, MacMenamin J held further that it was of relevance to examine whether or not
there is evidence that the state authorities are taking advantage of detention to violate
constitutional rights or to subject the applicant to inhuman or degrading treatment.27 This
seems to broaden the application of the ‘evil purpose’ test to situations other than where
the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment is at issue. MacMenamin J cited
Richardson as authority for this proposition.
However, in The State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, Barrington J held
that a prisoner could be successful in an application for release under Article 40.4 if the
authorities intended to do nothing, or, significantly, if they were unable to rectify the
conditions of detention which were a serious danger to a prisoner’s life or health. Such
circumstances would constitute “exceptional circumstances” warranting release. This
is of importance as Barrington J included in those circumstances, situations where the
authorities are unable to rectify conditions as opposed to having an ‘evil’ intention to
maintain them. Similarly, Budd J in Brennan v. The Governor of Portlaoise Prison28 found,
in an Article 40 inquiry, that as well as showing the conditions in which the applicant was
held seriously endangered the right to life or health, the applicant must satisfy the court
that the authorities were unwilling or unable to rectify the conditions. Again, Budd J allows
for the possibility for an action to succeed even when malicious intent cannot be proven,
but also where the authorities are unable to rectify the conditions in question.
The decision in Kinsella v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, which postdates Mulligan, is
more in keeping with the judgments of Brennan and Richardson. There, Hogan J recited
the requirement in earlier caselaw that a breach of the rights of a prisoner requires a
malicious motive on the part of the authorities, but went on to find a breach of the right to
bodily integrity in the absence of any such motive. It would appear that this decision, if not
in principle then at least in effect, has retreated from the requirement that an evil intent
on the part of the authorities is essential before a breach of rights will be found. From
Hogan J’s judgment, the attitude of the prison authorities is more relevant to the nature of
the remedy (in this case, release) rather than the presence or absence of a breach.
It should also be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has held that a
willingness to improve conditions cannot exculpate prior events which were incompatible
with the Convention.29 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has made it
clear that in cases where inhuman and degrading treatment is alleged, the absence of
malicious motives held by the authorities responsible for the treatment will not prevent a
finding that Article 3 has been breached.30
THE TORT DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CLAIMS BY PRISONERS
The Mulligan decision suggests that where a prisoner is seeking relief under the
Constitution in a plenary action, tort principles will be relevant to the assessment of the
court. In that case, the plaintiff argued that the treatment he had received constituted an
actionable wrong or tort under the Constitution.

27
28
29
30
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The High Court held that while the authorities owed a duty of care to the applicant under
the law of tort, there was also a right of action and remedy within the Constitution if that
duty was breached. MacMenamin J held that where the rights were manifested both
constitutionally and in tort form, defences in the law of torts such as volenti non fit injuria,
foreseeability, and contributory negligence may arise.31
In the particular circumstances of the case, involving claims of a breach of constitutional
rights arising out of inter alia a requirement to slop out using a chamber pot, MacMenamin
J found that the plaintiff’s case was primarily relying on the assertion of constitutional
rights in tort form and, as a corollary, the defendant was entitled to assert that no
rights were violated, the rights involved were limited, or to rely on defences in tort law.
MacMenamin J placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the prisoner had failed to
inform the prison authorities of the medical problems he alleged were occasioned by his
conditions, in this case, haemorrhoids, in finding against Mr. Mulligan.
SUMMARY OF THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES FROM MULLIGAN
MacMenamin J in Mulligan provided the following summary of the legal principles
considered to be applicable to cases taking by prisoners alleging breaches of their
constitutional rights:

(a) The right to bodily integrity necessitates that the Executive should protect the
right to health of persons held in custody as well as is reasonably possible in all the
circumstances (The State (C) v. Frawley);
(b) There is also a right, be it framed negatively or positively, not to be exposed to
inhuman or degrading treatment. Here a material consideration in determining the
constitutional status of the matter complained of is the purpose and intention of
the restriction and privations; in particular whether they are punitive, malicious or
whether they are evil in purpose (The State (C) v. Frawley);
(c) A further relevant consideration is whether there is evidence that State authorities
are taking advantage of detention to violate constitutional rights or to subject the
applicant to inhuman or degrading treatment (The State (Richardson) v. Governor of
Mountjoy Prison);
(d) The conditions of detention must not be such as to seriously endanger a prisoner’s
life or health (Richardson);
(e) If the conditions of detention are potentially life or health threatening, a court
should ask whether there is evidence that the authorities are for some legitimate
reason unable to rectify the conditions (Richardson);
(f) There is a right of privacy subject to limitations imposed by detention;
(g) A court must enquire the extent to which considerations of security, including the
protection of prisoners themselves, requires a limitation of their rights (Richardson);
(h) A court should enquire as to the extent of complaints made by a prisoner or other
prisoners (Richardson);
(i) A court must assess the extent to which the vindication of a claimed right would
be practical (Murray v. Ireland);

31 [2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 18, following Hanrahan v. Merck Sharpe and Dohme [1988] ILRM 629.
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(j) A court must establish the extent of the burden which might be placed on the
authorities in the vindication of the right claimed; whether the burden is in all
the circumstances proportionate to the right asserted in the overall context of the
prisoner’s conditions of detention (Murray);
(k) There is a right of freedom to communicate; the limitation of which is subject to
the principle of proportionality as must all such limitations on a constitutional right
[be]. Other constitutional rights may also arise in the future (Holland);
(l) A court must establish the extent to which, on the facts of this case the nature
of the constitutional wrong asserted necessitates the application of other principles
applicable to the law of torts (McDonnell).32
CASELAW ON ASPECTS OF PRISON CONDITIONS
This section examines caselaw on particular aspects of prison conditions from the Irish
courts and under the European Convention on Human Rights.
SLOPPING OUT AND CELL CONDITIONS
Slopping out, or the discharge of human waste into a receptacle such as a bucket or
chamber pot, has been litigated as a breach of rights under the Constitution and the
Convention in some cases.
The State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison33 involved a prisoner applying for
an inquiry under Article 40.4 of the Constitution into the conditions in the then women’s
section of Mountjoy prison. Each morning, an average of 16 prisoners engaged in slopping
out using a cold water tap over a sink, and steel wool. The applicant claimed that because
of the pressure of time to finish the process, some prisoners emptied chamber pots into
the sink in which they washed themselves. There was also a complaint that the toilet
doors were made of opaque glass and could not be locked from the inside. In Barrington
J’s view, slopping out made it inherently probable that human waste would appear in the
sink, that this procedure failed to respect the applicant’s health, and that the applicant
would be entitled to relief by mandamus. Barrington J also laid emphasis on the fact that
the practices at issue had continued for nine years. As the authorities agreed to alter the
regime it was not necessary to make an order.
In the Mulligan decision, the plaintiff claimed that his right to bodily integrity and his right
to privacy under the Constitution had been breached. He also argued that the conditions
breached his right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
The plaintiff had been the sole occupant of his cell which measured ten feet by eight
feet and contained a bed, a bedside locker, an armchair, a plastic chair, shelving units,
a desktop computer, a television set and VCR machine, a reading light, electric fan,
radiator and a window. The door contained a spy hole. The court found ventilation to be
“primitive”.34 Two aluminium sliding sections in an aperture, and a missing window pane
were the only means of ventilation.

32 [2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 108. Internal citations omitted.
33 [1980] ILRM 82.
34 [2010] IEHC 269, at paragraph 29.
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During the day there was adequate access to toilets. At night prisoners used a chamber
pot with a handle and a lid, made of heavy plastic. The applicant said he had to defecate
into the pot on average three to four times per week and that this was extremely painful
and aggravated an anal fissure and haemorrhoids. The plaintiff had spent five years in
Portlaoise prison. He had been asked if he had a medical condition on admission but did
not mention any pre–existing problems. He complained once to the prison doctor about
haemorrhoids, two and half months after he was detained and placed in custody. He said
he felt humiliated as a result and particularly degraded in light of his condition.
The hygiene facilities were also, in the words of the court, “below standard”,35 with no
running water in the cell. A dish of water was provided but once used there was no other
water available during lock up. Each morning, the chamber pots were emptied at two
sluice rooms at either end of the landing.
A consultant microbiologist gave evidence that using a sluice could potentially give rise
to health risks through contamination. The plaintiff stated that he had been splashed
by human waste when using the sluice. MacMenamin J held, however, that there was
no real evidence of a rush to use the sluice and found soap, disinfectant and bleach
were provided, meaning the sluice was clean and in good order. Overall, MacMenamin J
concluded that “the ventilation, sanitation and hygiene regime fell significantly below the
standard one would expect at the time”.36 However, this was not the end of the matter.
The applicant had called evidence regarding the effect of straining to use a chamber pot
and a feeling of pressure to use the toilet during the day. MacMenamin J accepted this
evidence, but considered the fact that he had not presented for treatment in a timely
fashion to be important. Experts further gave evidence that the anxiety of the applicant
had been mild and he had a stoical and non–complaining personality.
MacMenamin J examined the other aspects of the regime in Portlaoise, noting the wide
range of classes available, the fact that prisoners could exercise, take a shower or go to
the gym, and have lunch either communally or in their cell. Prisoners could spend up to
12 hours a day out of the cell. Prisoner–staff relations were found to be relatively good and
there was no ‘lights out’ regime. There was no evidence that a prison officer passed any
remarks or comments with regard to slopping out. MacMenamin J held “in this aspect the
situation was different from the “impoverished” or poor general regime described in some
of the international jurisprudence”.37
MacMenamin J placed much emphasis on the tort aspects of the claim and, in particular,
the fact that the applicant made only one complaint about his haemorrhoids. Because
of this, the court considered the lack of complaint raised “serious questions as to the
extent to which the respondents could be “fixed with”, or on “notice” of the applicant’s
prior history”38 and the onus was on the prisoner to apprise the medical authorities of the
condition. In this respect, MacMenamin J took account of the fact that the applicant had
been the spokesman on behalf of Real IRA prisoners in Portlaoise.
It was further accepted by the court that it was not an economic proposition to introduce
in–cell sanitation and there was nowhere to accommodation high security prisoners
during any such works.39 However, the court was not convinced that the prison authorities
ever thoroughly examined the possibility of providing an automatic visual unlock facility.

35
36
37
38
39
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MacMenamin J noted that there was no evidence that the authorities were acting with
motives which were punitive, malicious or evil in purpose. Still less was there evidence
that the authorities were taking advantage of the applicant’s detention to violate his
constitutional rights. MacMenamin J held that the conditions, though demeaning, were
not such as to seriously endanger the applicant’s life or health.
In the absence of ‘doubling–up’ in the cell, MacMenamin J could not find a breach of
the right to privacy. MacMenamin J was not convinced that the process of transferring
the contents of the chamber pots to the sluices engaged a privacy right to the degree
necessary to give rise to a cause of action.
On the right to bodily integrity, MacMenamin J accepted that the conditions affected
Mr. Mulligan’s health and wellbeing. Without putting the authorities on notice, however,
remedial measures could not have been adopted. The court did emphasise also, however,
that the right to bodily integrity sought to be relied on by Mr Mulligan was very specifically
framed in the context of the particular circumstances of the applicant as a spokesman
and member of a political group. He was not an ordinary prisoner who might well have
acted very differently.
The Court also noted that on the evidence, the applicant’s argument amounted to the
position that the only way to vindicate his rights it could only be that E Block of Portlaoise
would have to be shut down and replaced with an entirely new facility. Such broad
ordering and allocation of public resources was a matter for the Executive and the courts
should be reluctant to intervene.
The court therefore dismissed the claim for damages for breaches of his constitutional rights.
The court in Mulligan also examined the claims under Articles 3 and 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. MacMenamin J noted that under Article 3, the totality of
the conditions and their cumulative effect must be examined in any such claim. In the
court’s view, the out of cell time and the other positive aspects of the prisoner’s detention
outweighed the effect of slopping out, and the claim under Article 3 failed. The fact that
the prisoner was not required to share a cell was a key element of the decisions under
Article 3 and Article 8. In this respect, Mulligan appears to leave open the possibility that
a prisoner slopping out in cramped cell conditions in the presence of others may have a
greater chance of success.
The ultimate outcome regarding the claim of a breach of the right to privacy contrasts with
the Scottish decision of Re Greens, Stanger and Wilson40 (hereinafter Greens), discussed
further below, where a situation involving prisoners queuing to empty chamber pots into a
sluice was found to be a breach of the prisoners’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
Counsel for the petitioner in the Scottish decision in Greens criticised MacMenamin
J’s analysis on the basis, inter alia, that the High Court relied on out of date caselaw on
slopping out from the European Court of Human Rights. It is true that Mulligan did not
examine the more recent Strasbourg jurisprudence discussed further below.
The decision may, however, be confined to its particular circumstances. MacMenamin J
laid emphasis on the fact that the prisoner involved was a spokesperson for others and
was in a different position to those who might not be able to communicate their problems.
This was especially important in the context of the tort dimension of the case which
MacMenamin J clearly considered to be crucial.

40 [2011] CSOH 79.
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Sanitation facilities comprised one aspect of the claim regarding conditions in Kinsella. Mr.
Kinsella had spent 11 days in conditions which included the use of a cardboard box in the
corner of the cell. The combination of this and his conditions generally were held to give
rise to a breach of the right to bodily integrity.
The applicant was on protection and was placed in an observation cell in the basement
of the prison. The cell, approximately three metres by three metres, was entirely padded
and contained nothing other than a mattress. There was a small window providing some
natural light. The window had a shutter but there was a dispute in evidence as to whether
the shutter was working. The applicant further maintained that he was provided with no
reading material and had no access to a radio or television.
Hogan J. held that these conditions had breached the applicant’s right to bodily integrity,
finding that the detention had amounted to a “form of sensory deprivation”,41 noting that
the term ‘sensory deprivation’ was being used advisedly, as the conditions were still very
far removed from those found in Ireland v. United Kingdom.42 Hogan J. considered that
the protection afforded by Article 40.3.2 extended to the integrity of the human mind and
personality and that prolonged detention in such circumstances gave rise to the risk of
psychiatric disturbance.
The court, however, refused to rule that Mr. Kinsella was in unlawful detention at that time
given that the authorities were not acting out of malice, but had placed him in that cell as
there was nowhere else where he could be accommodated.
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRISON CONDITIONS
There has been far more extensive examination of the rights of prisoners and the effect of
prison conditions from the European Court of Human Rights and, in particular, in Scottish
caselaw drawing on the Convention’s principles.
Article 2, the right to life, may become involved in extreme cases where conditions give
rise to threats to life. Most cases concerning prison conditions, however, will come under
Article 3. Article 8, the right to private and family life, may also be involved if the privacy of
the prisoner is an issue.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides protection against torture
or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is clear that it applies
irrespective of the circumstances or the victim’s behaviour.43 There has been no specific
definition of the terms ‘inhuman and degrading’, but the treatment must attain a minimum
level of severity in order to fall into this category. All the circumstances of the case will
be examined.44 These include the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental
effects, and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.45 The amount
of exercise and contact with the outside world the prisoner has are important, as is the
duration of the detention.46 The suffering and humiliation involved must go beyond the
inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with legitimate punishment and
the deprivation of liberty in order to be prohibited by Article 3.
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The State may not avoid liability under Article 3 by blaming the attitude and behaviour
of the prisoner. For example, it has been held to be irrelevant if a prisoner fails to
participate in prison activities. All inmates should be afforded prison conditions in
conformity with Article 3.47
Regarding the relevance under Article 3 as to whether the authorities intended for the
prisoner to suffer, the Court has said “although the question whether the purpose of the
treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the
absence of any such purpose cannot exclude a finding of violation of Article 3”.48 The Court
has also said that “lack of resources cannot in principle justify prison conditions which
are so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 3”.49
The burden of proof is on the prisoner to establish the fact of ill–treatment ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’, however, in reality, the European Court of Human Rights takes account
of the practical difficulties faced by prisoners in providing evidence for their claims,
particularly when the Government is in possession of information which will prove the
facts, such as the size of a cell.
There is a lack of specific guidance from the Court on what constitutes treatment in
breach of Article 3 and the cases turn on their individual facts. However, in the course of
coming to an overall conclusion on substantive conditions, the Court has commented on
specific aspects of detention. It should also be noted that the European Court of Human
Rights has drawn on the General Reports of the European Committee on the Prevention
of Torture in examining what the Convention requires. The Court also examines the
reports of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture from the countries against which
a case is taken.
VENTILATION
The absence of natural light and fresh air has been viewed as a contributory factor in
finding an infringement of Article 3. In circumstances where metal shutters blocked
access to fresh air and natural light, and there was overcrowding, a breach of Article 3
was found.50
MINIMUM SPACE AND OVERCROWDING
The European Court of Human Rights was initially slow to lay down specific space
requirements for all situations. In Trepashkin v Russia51 it was stated that:

the court cannot decide, once and for all, how much personal space should
be allocated to a detainee in terms of the Convention. That depends on many
relevant factors, such as the duration of detention in particular conditions, the
possibilities for outdoor exercise, the physical and mental condition of the
detainee, and so on. This is why, whereas the Court may take into account
general standards in this area developed by other international institutions such
as the CPT, these cannot constitute a decisive argument.52
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The Court has, however, relied on reports of the CPT criticising overcrowding in its
decisions53 and several decisions have found overcrowding to be key factor in a violation
of Article 3. In others, relatively restricted space has been held to be acceptable if other
factors compensate for it. In all cases, all of the circumstances of the detention are
examined. Unless especially severe, overcrowding will usually need to be accompanied by
other aspects of poor conditions to give rise to concerns under Article 3.
The reasons for overcrowding are irrelevant. In Mamedova v Russia it was held that:
“whether overpopulation was due to maintenance works or to other causes is immaterial
for the Court’s analysis, it being incumbent on the respondent Government to organise
its penitentiary system in such a way that ensures respect for the dignity of detainees,
regardless of financial and logistical difficulties”.54
In Peers v Greece,55 the Court took into account the fact that the applicant had to spend a
considerable part of each 24 hour period practically confined to his bed in a cell with no
ventilation and no window, which would at times become unbearably hot. He also had to
use the toilet in the presence of another inmate and be present while the toilet was being
used by his cellmate. There was no evidence of a positive intention on the part of the State
to humiliate or debase, but the Court considered that the lack of such a purpose will not
rule a violation out. The Court also took account of the fact that the competent authorities
took no steps to improve the objectively unacceptable conditions. In the view of the Court,
these conditions diminished the human dignity of the applicant.
Where the amount of space for a prisoner is very limited, this fact of itself may give rise to
a claim under Article 3. For example, the prisoners in the case of Kalashnikov v Russia,56
had only 0.9 to 1.9 square metres of space each.
Decisions of the Court arising out of Polish prison conditions have also given rise to
statements about the effect of overcrowding. In Orchowski v. Poland57 the prisoner
was detained for the majority of the time in cells where he had less than three square
metres of personal space, and sometimes less than two metres squared. The applicant’s
situation was further exacerbated by the fact that he was confined to his cell day and
night, save for one hour of daily outdoor exercise and, possibly, an additional, though
short, time spent in an entertainment room.
The Court noted that the CPT’s standard recommended living space per prisoner for Polish
detention facilities (four square metres) was higher than the national statutory minimum
standard. The Court also concluded that the applicant was allowed a one–hour long
period of outdoor exercise each day, one hot shower per week, which was taken together
with other prisoners; his bed linen was changed once every two weeks, his underwear
changed usually once a week, and all meals were taken inside the cell.
The Court further noted that the applicant had been transferred, over a period of six years,
twenty–seven times between eight different prisons and remand centres. He was also
very frequently moved between cells within each of the detention facilities in question.
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On the specific issue of frequent transfers, the Court noted:

Too frequent transfers of a person under the existing system of rotating transfers
of detainees may create a problem under the Convention. By using this system,
the authorities provide an urgent but short–term and superficial relief to the
individuals concerned and to the facilities in which the rate of overcrowding
is particularly high. As shown by the example of the applicant in the instant
case, in the light of massive overcrowding the system does not provide a real
improvement of a detainee’s situation. On the contrary, such frequent transfers
may, in the Court’s opinion, increase the feelings of distress experienced by a
person deprived of liberty and who is held in conditions which fall short of the
Convention.58
Overall, the Court held that in these circumstances, aggravated by the frequent transfers,
there had been a breach of Article 3.
In Sikorski v. Pologne59 the Court found a breach of Article 3 in circumstances where a
prisoner was subject to a long period of incarceration without the possibility of moving
freely outside of the cell, combined with poor hygiene conditions which the authorities
had not acted to improve. The overcrowding rate at issue was 149% of the prison’s
capacity. The applicant had been detained in various prisons, in some of which he was
allowed out of the cell for two to three hours per week, in others for 45 minutes per day.
Furthermore, the prisoner was detained with several others in a very restricted space for
the entire day in a non–air conditioned cell, beside toilet facilities which were not always
sufficiently separated from the cell. The Court also considered that as the room served as
both a bedroom and place to eat, it could not be controversial that the hygiene conditions
were likely to become a concern.60
Regarding the size of prison cells, the Court emphasised that the cumulative effect of
the conditions must be examined. However, it referred to the recommendations of the
Committee for the Prevention of Torture which suggest a minimum of four square metres
per prisoner for multiple occupancy cells and nine square metres for single prison cells.61
ANANYEV V. RUSSIA
The most extensive discussion of the requirements of the Convention regarding cell size
and accommodation is to be found in the decision of Ananyev v. Russia.62 In this case
the Court issued a ‘pilot judgment’, whereby it joined a number of applications together
and gave quite specific advice to the Russian authorities on how to deal with the large
numbers of prisoners on remand there in ways compatible with the Convention. In the
course of the judgment the Court engaged in its most specific examination yet of cell sizes,
drawing on General and Country Reports of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture,
and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
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The Court began its assessment of Article 3 by examining the standard of proof required
in such cases. The Court noted that while ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ was the standard
adopted, this was not to be taken as a straightforward application of those terms within
national legal systems. The “level of persuasion”63 depends on the nature of the facts
and the rights at stake. The Court also noted that it was mindful of the difficulties faced
by applicants seeking to collect evidence to support their claims. The Court held that
prisoners could not realistically be expected to, for example, have photographs of their
cells or precise measurements of the cells. The Court also stated that the principle of ‘he
who asserts must prove’ is not always rigorously applied in such cases as it will usually be
the Government rather than the prisoner who will have access to information capable of
corroborating or refuting the allegations. However, the Court also held “an applicant must
provide an elaborate and consistent account of the conditions of his or her detention”.64
The Court reiterated that ill–treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order
to fall within the scope of Article 3. This usually involves actual bodily injury or intense
physical or mental suffering, but, where:

treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or
diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or
inferiority capable of breakingztrading and also fall within the prohibition of
Article 3.65
Any such suffering must go beyond that inherent in detention and account must be taken
of the cumulative effects of the conditions as well as specific allegations made by the
applicant. The length of the period during which a person is detained in such conditions
must also be considered.66
Dealing specifically with overcrowding, the Court held that the extreme lack of space in a
prison cell weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account when establishing if there
has been degrading treatment. Considering the country reports given by the CPT, the
Court noted that, while the provision of four square metres of space remains the desirable
standard, the Court had previously found that where applicants have less than three
metres of personal space, the overcrowding must be considered so severe as to justify of
itself a finding of a violation of Article 3.67 The Court also reviewed its caselaw on the lack
of a space for prisoners to sleep.
Overall, the Court held that, in deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article
3 on account of a lack of personal space, the Court has to have regard to three elements:

1. Each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell;
2. Each detainee must have at least three square metres of floor space; and
3. The overall surface of the cell must be such as to allow the detainees to move
freely between the furniture items.
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The Court held that the absence of any of these elements “creates in itself a strong
presumption that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading treatment and were
in breach of Article 3”.68
The Court went on to examine the situation when prisoners have sufficient personal
space but there are problems concerning other aspects of the detention. The Court held
that even if there is sufficient space, other aspects of detention are relevant for the
assessment of compliance with Article 3. These elements include access to outdoor
exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of heating arrangements,
the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and
hygienic requirements, noting that even in larger prison cells, the combination of lack of
space and a lack of ventilation or lighting gave rise to a violation of Article 3.
The Court also referred to the CPT’s recommendations that prisoners be allowed at least
one hour of exercise in the open air every day, preferably as part of a broader programme
of out–of–cell activities. The Court noted that a short duration of outdoor exercise
exacerbated poor conditions and the physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities
in terms of their size and nature were also relevant.
The Court emphasised the importance of unobstructed and sufficient access to natural
light and fresh air in cells. In the view of the Court restrictions on access to natural light
and air occasioned by metal shutters seriously aggravated the situation of prisoners,
though without overcrowding or a malfunctioning ventilation system and artificial lighting,
the threshold of severity under Article 3 would not be met by the use of shutters alone.
SPECIAL ACCOMMODATION NEEDS
In Price v. United Kingdom69 a severely disabled woman, who had lost four limbs and
suffered from kidney problems was detained for seven days for contempt of court. She
was required to sleep in her wheelchair while detained in police custody because the
facilities were unsuitable, the toilets were inaccessible, and she could not reach the panic
buttons. In prison she was detained in a health care centre. There, male officers had to
accompany her to the toilet. Her health suffered as a result of the conditions. The Court
found a breach of Article 3, her treatment being degrading.
HYGIENE
In Melnik v Ukraine the Court considered overcrowding, poor conditions of hygiene and
sanitation, and inadequate medical care to amount to a breach of Article 3. On the issue of
hygiene, the Court held that:

the fact the applicant had only once–weekly access to a shower and his linen and
clothes could be washed only once a week raises concerns … given the acutely
overcrowded accommodation. Such conditions would have had an aggravating effect
on his poor health… taking the aforementioned factors into account, the Court
concludes that the applicant’s conditions of hygiene and sanitation are unsatisfactory
and would have contributed to the deterioration of his poor health.70
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SLOPPING OUT AND SANITARY CONDITIONS
The European Court of Human Rights has found the presence of slopping out, in
conjunction with other poor aspects of conditions, to breach Article 3 of the Convention
in some cases. MacMenamin J in Mulligan noted that, with regard to Article 3 claims, no
case had found the practice of slopping out or the absence of in–cell sanitation per se
to be a violation of the Convention. However, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture has strongly condemned the practice both generally and in the Irish
context, and the Court’s position does appear to be evolving on the issue.
In an early case, cited in Mulligan, DeLazarus v. United Kingdom,71 the applicant challenged
the conditions of his detention under Article 3, alleging that he had been segregated from
other prisoners, and subject to overcrowding, a lack of purposeful activity, and a lack
of in–cell sanitation. The European Commission on Human Rights held the complaint to
be manifestly unfounded. The Court considered that the applicant could not complain
of overcrowding when he had been held in a single cell and this must have reduced the
difficulties caused by the lack of in–cell sanitation.
In another early case, NH v. United Kingdom,72 the applicant was kept in a punishment cell
in which there was no toilet or running water. He had to slop out three times a day and at
those times was required to clean utensils and collect drinking and washing water. In the
view of the Commission, the application was manifestly unfounded as the facts did not
reach the minimum level of severity to amount to a violation of Article 3.
Later caselaw, however, indicates a different approach to Article 3. As Lady Dorrian
recognised in the Scottish case of Greens, concepts of inhuman and degrading treatment
have evolved since the Convention came into force and, in particular, since 2001 the
European Court of Human Rights has found violations of Article 3 where a person has
been required to relieve themselves into a bucket in the presence of others and where
they have been present while the facilities were used by others, except when allowing
prisoners to visit sanitation facilities posed particular and serious security risks.
Peers v. Greece73 concerned a prisoner in a shared cell in which he was required to use
a ‘squat’ toilet with no screen or curtain separating the toilet from the cell. There was no
sink, and the supplies of toilet paper and toiletries were found to be inadequate.
The cell was small and there was only one window in the roof which did not open and
through which no light could pass. The prisoner had also been denied sheets and pillows
and there were difficulties in communicating with prison staff. The Court found that the
combination of all these factors amounted to a violation of Article 3.
In Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia74 the prisoner was detained in a cell in which the
toilet consisted of a narrow pipe in the corner, which the applicant refused to use because
of the conditions involving infestation with cockroaches and rats. The cell was also small
and he had to share a bed with another prisoner. This amounted to a breach of Article 3.
More recent caselaw, not cited in Mulligan, has taken a more stringent line regarding
slopping out. In Malechkov v. Bulgaria75 the Court held that where a prisoner is required
to relieve himself in a bucket, while being detained alone for practically 24 hours a day for
more than four months with no exposure to natural light or the possibility of physical and
other out of cell activity, this amounted to a breach of Article 3.
71
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The Court also held that, despite being accommodated alone in a cell, subjecting
a detainee to the inconvenience of having to relieve himself in a bucket cannot be
considered warranted, except in specific situations where allowing visits to the sanitary
facilities would pose concrete and serious security risks.76
In Radkov v. Bulgaria (No. 2)77 the applicant was held for part of his detention in a cell with
others without toilet facilities, sink or running water. He was allowed to go to the toilet
just three times a day, for ten minutes at a time. Otherwise the occupants of the cell were
required to relieve themselves in a plastic bucket which they could empty and clean when
using the toilets outside the cell. For part of his detention he occupied a cell by himself.
The domestic court held that having to use a bucket in a cell measuring around 10 metres
squared without sufficient ventilation in the presence of others, was a breach of Article 3.
Regarding the period spent alone in a cell, the Court said it saw “no reason not to extend
that conclusion [that there had been a breach of Article 3] to the time when he was kept in
an individual cell”.78 This would seem to indicate that the Court is prepared to contemplate
situations when slopping out in a single cell could amount to a breach of Article 3.
However, the court in the Scottish case of Greens resists this conclusion.
It seems to be the case that, while the development of prisoners’ rights jurisprudence
under the Convention means the Court is becoming stricter on the situations in which
slopping out per se will be considered not to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment,
for the moment other aspects of poor conditions will be required in order to find a breach.
Most recently, in Ananyev v. Russia, the Court examined the Convention’s requirements
regarding sanitation facilities. The Court noted recommendations of the CPT and the UN
Minimum Rules, holding that:

Access to properly equipped and hygienic sanitary facilities is of paramount
importance for maintaining the inmates’ sense of personal dignity … not only
are hygiene and cleanliness integral parts of the respect that individuals owe
to their bodies and to their neighbour with whom they share premises for long
periods of time … A truly humane environment is not possible without ready
access to toilet facilities or the possibility of keeping one’s body clean.79
The Court noted that in many Russian prisons the lavatory pan was placed in the corner
of the cell and either lacked any separation from the living area or was separated by a
single partition of around one and a half metres high. The Court considered this was
objectionable not only from a hygiene point of view but also deprived a prisoner of any
privacy.80 The Court also emphasised the importance of showers and the need to take
measures against infestation of rodents, fleas, lice, bedbugs and other vermin.81
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USE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN
SLOPPING OUT CASES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Courts in other jurisdictions, notably Scotland, have examined the compatibility of prison
conditions with the European Convention on Human Rights.
The case of Napier v. Scottish Ministers82 (hereinafter Napier) involved prison conditions
in which prisoners were confined two to a cell for at least 20 hours on average per day.
The cells were found by the Scottish court to be “cramped, stuffy and gloomy”.83 Prisoners
had no access to a toilet during the night and for extended periods at the weekend and
were required to slop out. There was no structured activity other than walking in the yard
for one hour, and recreation for ninety minutes per week.
Examining the effect of the conditions on the prisoner, the court held that they induced
feelings of worthlessness and disgust, as well as avoidance of using the chamber pot.
The petitioner had eczema, which was considered to be of “crucial importance” to the
lower court’s determination.84 The court held that the petitioner’s serious outbreak of
eczema resurged and persisted because of the conditions of detention. The eczema
was of itself a source of acute embarrassment and humiliation. The petitioner believed
that the infection of the eczema was caused by the conditions of detention, particularly
slopping out, which belief the court described as reasonable and held to be felt acutely.
The petitioner was held, therefore, to have been exposed to conditions which, taken
together, meant that he had been subjected to degrading treatment in infringement
of Article 3.85
In distinguishing this case in Mulligan, MacMenamin J commented on the fact that the
cumulative effect of the conditions, rather than the requirement to slop out only, resulted
in the finding that Article 3 had been breached. The Court considered that Napier must
be seen as a case where slopping out had a particular obvious and evident impact on the
prisoner. It was also relevant that the prison authorities in Scotland could have easily
installed integrated sanitation facilities and they had deliberately decided not to address
the cell conditions.
GREENS V SCOTTISH MINISTERS
In 2011, three former prisoners at HMP Peterhead in Scotland took judicial review
proceedings complaining, inter alia, that the conditions of their incarceration subjected
them to inhuman or degrading treatment and were also an unjustified interference with
the right to respect for private life.86
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At HMP Peterhead each cell was equipped with a chemical toilet known as a ‘porta potti’.
The petitioners claimed that the use of these toilets, the lack of hand washing facilities
within the cells, the lack of ventilation, and the practice of ‘bombing’, whereby prisoners
defecated into newspapers or other items or urinated into jars and threw them out of the
window, breached Article 3.
The court accepted that it is not necessary to establish damage to physical or mental
health for a breach of Article 3 to be established, but treatment of “some severity” must
nonetheless be made out.87 Examining the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, the court held that single cell slopping out per se had not been found to
amount to a breach of Article 3 in any case, but that the European Court had repeatedly
found a violation of Article 3 in situations where a prisoner has been required to relieve
himself into a bucket in the presence of others, and having to be present when others
did the same.
The court in Greens specifically rejected the contention that Article 3 requires the use of
a screened and flushing toilet. The court considered that the finding in Napier was based
on the triple vices of overcrowding, slopping out, and an impoverished regime. By contrast,
the court held the petitioners in Greens based their cases very strongly on the slopping
out process itself.
The court rejected evidence from the petitioners regarding the nature of the slopping
out process and the extent of the smell, and placed a great deal of emphasis on the
facts that the prisoners involved did not have to share a cell, that work was available
and there were many opportunities for out–of–cell time. The lack of overcrowding in
the prison was also important. The court considered the privacy of the single cell and
the accepted practice of blocking the spy hole when using the chemical toilet (despite
being a breach of the regulations) to be very important factors and also rejected the
prisoners’ evidence that they felt stressed and humiliated. The court noted that there
were differences between the use of buckets and chamber pots and the use of chemical
toilets. Taken together, the court did not consider that the petitioners’ human dignity
was diminished by the conditions.

87 [2011] CSOH 79, at paragraph 257.
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Lady Dorrian examined the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, holding:

With the exception of cells of a size allowing less than about 3m² per person,
the ECtHR has not isolated one aspect of imprisonment as being sufficiently
severe to meet the threshold [under Article 3]. … It is clear that the ECtHR
has repeatedly found a violation of Article 3 in situations where a prisoner has
been required to relieve himself into a bucket in the presence of others, and
having to be present when others did the same. … in my view it is clear from
the consideration of what was said in Malechkov that the court seems to be
expressing the view that to require the use of a bucket even in a single cell
constitutes a breach of Article 3. Radkov is the only case of the many which
were cited which reaches such a conclusion on the basis of the use of a bucket
alone and care must therefore be taken in considering and applying that
decision. The reliance on the passage from Malenchkov is made without regard
to the wider considerations which applied in that case or to the fact that there
the breach was not found to consist in the requirement to use a bucket but
in the “cumulative effects of the unjustifiably stringent regime to which the
applicant had been subjected and the material conditions in which he had been
kept”. I would therefore be reluctant to conclude that this case forms part of
the clear and consistent jurisprudence of the court. In any event, even taking
the decision at its highest, it does not follow that any regime which requires
slopping out to any degree is in itself a breach of Article 3. If the difference
between requiring to use a chamber pot and a chemical toilet is “day and night”
the difference between having to use a bucket and a chemical toilet is at least
as great. I do not accept the petitioners’ submission that to require a prisoner to
use any receptacle other than a screened and flushing toilet constitutes a breach
of Article 3.88
Significantly, Lady Dorrian seems to be leaving open the possibility that a different
conclusion might have been reached in circumstances where a person was required to
use a chamber pot or other such item rather than a chemical toilet. The judgment also
notes the tension within some of the Convention cases regarding whether slopping out in
a single cell can amount to a breach of Article 3.
No breach of Article 3 was found, but the court in Greens did find a breach of Article 8. In
its view, the scope of ‘private life’ can include the activities of discharging bodily waste
and maintaining a standard of cleanliness. The court was keen to point out that it was not
laying down a general principle that requiring a person to defecate into a bucket which
must be slopped out was a breach of Article 8. Assessing the facts before the court, it
held that there was no human right to a screened and flushing lavatory and the use of
a chemical toilet in a single cell where a sanitation work party empties such toilets was
not a breach of Article 8. However, when prisoners were required to slop out the chemical
toilets themselves and queue to do so, there had an interference with their private lives.
To be forced to queue in a line of others with a receptacle of one’s own waste and to have
to empty it in the presence of others constituted an infringement of Article 8. The Court
therefore awarded damages in the sum of £500.
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ENGLISH CASELAW
Regarding sanitation, in Broom v. Secretary of State for the Home Department89 a prisoner
was transferred between cells every three months and was not provided with an in–cell
privacy screen, which was exacerbated by the dirty nature of some of the toilets and the
presence of female prison officers. The court rejected the claim that there had been a
breach of Article 8, holding that imprisonment was of itself humiliating and his conditions
were no worse than ordinary prison regimes.90
R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department91 examined slopping out in
the context of a challenge to prison conditions under Article 3. Lord Hoffman reserved
his position as to whether the absence of in–cell sanitation per se constituted a breach of
Article 3. Lord Hoffman held:

It must, in my respectful opinion, be borne in mind that Article 3 was ...
prescribing a minimum standard, not a norm … It would, of course, be
unexceptionable for the courts of Scotland, or the courts of any other
jurisdiction, or their prison authorities to rule that the practice of slopping–out
was unacceptable and should cease. But to give that ruling as an interpretation
of an Article 3 obligation would, in my opinion, undermine the absolute
nature of the obligation in question. It would be unthinkable to rule that in no
circumstances could slopping–out in a prison, or comparable institution, be
tolerated. Whatever view one might have about the objectionable quality of
slopping–out, that view could not, in my opinion, be carried forward into an
acceptable interpretation of an absolute obligation in Article 3.92

NORTHERN IRELAND
In Martin v. Northern Ireland Prison Service93 the plaintiff claimed damages for breaches of
Article 3 and Article 8. Again, the plaintiff occupied a cell on his own. For much of the day
he was allowed out of the cell and could use ordinary toileting and hand washing facilities.
There was also a system of night unlock. Though the system was not performed as it
should have been on occasion, for the most part most prisoners could leave their cells at
night time to use the toilets.
In these circumstances no violation of Article 3 was found. However, Girvan J did find a
breach of Article 8. Girvan J found that the prison staff had been uncaring and hostile
towards prisoners in the slopping out process. In the view of the Court “if not properly
managed and handled with care the practice has the potential to be significantly
demeaning to a prisoner in an intimate aspect of private life”.94
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HEALTH
It has been established that inadequate healthcare may result in inhuman or degrading
treatment.95 The European Court of Human Rights does take into account the fact that
prison facilities may not be equivalent to those in the community, but requires treatment
to be compatible with the dignity of the individual.96
Failure to examine a prisoner when there are indications it might be necessary to do
so, amounts to inadequate medical assistance and was found to constitute degrading
treatment in Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine.97
Pilcic v Croatia held that a prisoner has the right of access to medical care without undue
delay, regardless of the regime in the prison.98 In Rohde v Denmark the Court held that
the failure to provide the “requisite medical assistance”99 can unnecessarily exacerbate
suffering and may violate Article 3. In Dobri v. Romania100 the Court noted the importance
of screening for highly infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. There, a prisoner
developed tuberculosis while in prison. This in combination with the conditions of the cell
in which he was detained gave rise to a violation of Article 3.
In Melnik v Ukraine the Court held that the State’s failure to prevent, diagnose and
cure tuberculosis along with the existence of overcrowding and unsanitary conditions
amounted to degrading treatment.101
In Mouisel v. France102 a prisoner was suffering from cancer and required transfer to
outside medical treatment. During this transfer and treatment he was handcuffed. This
caused suffering beyond that inherent in either imprisonment or chemotherapy and a
breach of Article 3 was found.
In Florea v. Romania the Court held that the authorities are obliged to take measures
to protect a prisoner from passive smoking if s/he has a condition which requires such
protection.103 In Elefteriadis v. Romania104 a prisoner had a chronic pulmonary condition
and was required to share a cell with two smokers and was kept in court waiting rooms
in which prisoners smoked. A breach of Article 3 was made out. In Aparicio Benito v.
Espagne105 a prisoner failed in his claim under Article 3 where he had a single cell and the
passive smoking only occurred in a single communal area.
Prisoners suffering from symptoms arising out of withdrawal from drugs should receive
adequate medical assistance or the State may be in violation of Article 3. In McGlinchey v.
United Kingdom106 the prisoner involved was addicted to heroin and suffering from asthma.
While detained, she suffered withdrawal and lost a lot of weight. Her condition was
monitored by the prison doctor, but not on a daily basis.
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She was removed to hospital and put on a life–support machine, where she died. The Court
found that Article 3 had been violated in relation to her treatment of heroin withdrawal. She
had not been seen for two days by a doctor despite suffering fits of vomiting and losing
weight. This posed a serious risk to her health and was the cause of great distress.
Where there is seriously inadequate medical treatment resulting in death, Article 2 may
be engaged. For example in Kats v. Ukraine, a prisoner was HIV positive and suffering
from a variety of chronic illnesses exacerbated by her condition. The Court found the
treatment she had received was very basic and often delayed. She was not moved to
the medical wing of the hospital or to a specialist hospital on the outside. Nor was
she released despite the deteriorating nature of her health. The Court held that the
prisoner’s death was caused indirectly by the inadequate medical assistance given to
her, violating Article 2.107
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that there is no general obligation
arising out of Article 3 to release prisoners on health grounds108 but if it is decided to
keep a seriously ill person in prison, the authorities should demonstrate special care in
guaranteeing such conditions of detention that correspond to the special needs arising
out of the person’s disability.
PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES
Particular attention must be paid to the position of mentally ill prisoners. In some such
cases, the right to liberty under Article 5 has been invoked. Failure to provide a mentally ill
prisoner with adequate psychiatric health care was found to breach Article 5(4) because of
the absence of a link between the aim and implementation of the deprivation of liberty.109
The failure to recognise the particular vulnerability of prisoners with mental illnesses may
lead to a finding they have been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Kucheruk
v. Ukraine held that prison authorities must take into consideration their vulnerability
and inability to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any
particular treatment.110
Renolde v. France111 concerned a man who took his life in his cell while awaiting his
trial. There were several reports available to the prison authorities indicating cognitive
deficiencies and paranoia. He made an attempt to commit suicide and was placed in a
cell on his own under supervision. During this period he assaulted a warder. He received
a penalty of 45 days in a punishment cell. His lawyer sought a psychiatric examination
of her client to ascertain the compatibility of his punishment with his mental state.
Mr Renolde was given medication, but received several doses without supervision of
whether he took them as required. He committed suicide the next day. No medication
was found in his body.
The Court found breaches of Article 2 and 3. The Court felt that the authorities, faced
with a prisoner known to have serious mental problems and posing a suicide risk, should
have taken special measures to ensure his continued detention was compatible with his
mental state.
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The Court reiterated that the vulnerability of the mentally ill called for special protection.
This applied all the more when a prisoner with severe disturbance was placed in solitary
confinement or a punishment cell for a prolonged period with an inevitable impact on
his mental state, particularly where there had already been an attempted suicide. The
authorities did not do all that could have been required of it to prevent the prisoner’s life
from being avoidably put at risk. The authorities knew of the risk to his life. As such, there
was a breach of Article 2.
There was also a breach of Article 3. The prisoner had been given the maximum
punishment available for assaulting the warden without any consideration being given to
his mental state or the fact that it was a first offence. This was not compatible with the
standard of treatment required for a mentally ill person and breached Article 3. The Court
reaffirmed that all prisoners had the right to conditions of detention compatible with
human dignity. In the case of mentally ill persons, any assessment of the conditions of
their detention under Article 3 had to take account their vulnerability and the difficulties
they faced in complaining about their treatment. The Court also noted that the treatment
of mentally ill persons may be incompatible with the standards imposed by Article 3 in the
protection of human dignity, even if the person involved may not be able to or cannot point
to any specific ill–effects.
Riviere v. France has also held that prisoners known to be suffering from serious mental
disturbance and posing a suicide risk require special measures geared to their condition.112
In that case, a prisoner with psychosis and suicidal tendencies was kept in prison.
The Court held this imposed suffering beyond that normally associated with imprisonment
and he required accommodation in a permanent specialised hospital.

112 1 1 July 2006, no. 3834/03. Translation from the French by the author. The applicant had served the
minimum tariff for his sentence but continued to be detained. His appeals for release were rejected. He had
a severe psychotic illness and was at risk of suicide. Though efforts were made to care for him, they were
not adequate. He was not in receipt of daily medical assistance. The Court held that those at risk of suicide,
even if it has not been attempted, require particular measures to be adapted to their condition. There was,
however, no general obligation to release a prisoner on health grounds.
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